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NOTES
The domicile may be acquired by (a) residence or (b) intention
to remain, which may be inferred in various circumstances as pay-
ment of taxes, establishment of a home or intention to become a
citizen. 8
It is to be noted that the status of the author is the determining
factor rather than that of the proprietor. Hence if the author is
not entitled to copyright, the proprietor can acquire no greater
right than the author himself possessed even though the proprietor
may be a citizen of this country. 9
It should be noted, that the proclamations of the President
regarding the existence of these reciprocal conditions does not
create the right of non-resident alien authors to benefit under the
copyright laws. It only extends the conditions under which these
privileges may be exercised. 40 Today, by proclamations, treaties
and conventions the United States has established copyright rela-
tions with most countries.
Each country should be carefully checked to fully appreciate
the extent the area in which these proclamations, treaties and
conventions apply. No two countries are identical, each compact
contains numerous qualifications which alter the particular act.
JOHN L. PLATrNER
JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS OF COMITY
IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS
The problem to be considered is that of jurisdictional conflict
between federal and state courts which could arise in the follow-
ing manner: The defendant commits an act or acts that are in
violation of both federal and state laws. The federal government
gains physical custody of the defendant and he is tried, convicted
and placed on probation. The question then arises; can the state
prosecute the defendant for violation of state laws? Do both courts
or only one court have jurisdiction? When does the first court's
jurisdiction cease? These and related questions will be discussed
in the following article.
HISTORY
The authorities seem to be in conflict in the case of either the
state or federal court first acquiring jurisdiction over the defendant
and to whether they must grant the other right to prosecute. The
38. Ricordi v. Columbia Graphophone Co., 258 Fed. 72 (D. 1919).
39. Bong v. Campbell Art Co., 214 U.S. 236 (1919).
40. Chappel v. Fields, 210 Fed. 864 (2d Cir. 1914).
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answer seems to depend on whether the word probation is inter-
preted to mean that the first court has both custody and control.
Ponzi v. Fessendent was the first case recognizing the doctrines
of comity between federal and state courts.- The Supreme Court
held that both courts have jurisdiction and the court first gaining
custody has the right to exhaust its jurisdiction unless consent is
obtained by the second court. This decision was upheld by Grant
v. Guernsey,:' which held that the defendant while on probation
was subject to the jurisdiction of the federal court and as such was
immune to prosecution by a state court, unless the federal court
chose to relinquish its first acquired right.4 Adding support to this
position was Dillingham v. United States, which held that one on
probation is not at large, nor at liberty except within the limits of
his probation. This trend of federal supremacy was affirmed in
Speece v. Toman," where the court held that one on probation from
a federal district court could not be taken out of federal custody
by a state court's subsequent prosecution without the express con-
sent of the federal court. This holding apparently did not follow
as closely the reasoning in the Guernsey case. Here the court held
the conviction by the state court was valid but could not be ex-
ecuted without the consent of the federal court. The result then
is that the second court can exercise its jurisdiction over the pro-
bationeer with the first court's consent.
United States v. Fenno7 opposed the holding of the Guernsey
case and held that under the rule of comity the second court has
jurisdiction on behalf of the first court. This is the case even though
consent of the first court is not obtained. This viewpoint was
further enlarged when in Rawls v. United States, the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the federal court had juris-
1. 258 U.S. 254 (1922).
2. See Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951). "The principle in accordance with
which the courts of one jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of
another, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and respect." Under this
rule the sovereigns have in effect agreed that the one first acquiring custody of the
defendant must be permitted to exhaust its remedy against him before the other will
exercise its jurisdiction over the defendant.
3. 63 F.2d 163 (10th Cir. 1933).
4. See United States v. Pendergast, 28 F. Supp. 601 (N.D. 1939) (Court implied
that it would always consent to state court's jurisdiction); United States v. McGowan,
80 F. Supp. 792 (D. 1948).
5. 76 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1935). The court said, "He is in law and in fact in the
custody and under the control of the court of his probation." This seems to be consistent
with the Guernsey view of equating probation and physical custody.
6. 23 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. 1938). The district court amended the probation order to
expire and directed delivery of the defendant to the Illinois court, so that the probation
order was not used as a means of conferring immunity from Illinois laws.)
7. 167 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1948).
8. 166 F.2d 532 (10th Cir. 1948). (The federal district court prosecuted the de-
fendant who was on parole from a state court.)
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diction over the defendant even though the state court had not
given its consent to the prosecution. The court also went on to say
that where there is no express objection by the first court there is
a presumption that the prior court has consented. 9 Under this view,
consent whether it be express or implied is needed only to comply
with the rule of comity. Strand v. Schmittroth ° followed the Fenno
decision but said that when the first court objects by issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus, the second court must release the prisoner.
However when a rehearing" was granted the court modified its
first decision holding that the consent of the first sovereign had
been given to the second in different ways: By actual turning over
the person to the second sovereign; by release on parole and by
failure of the first sovereign to object. This then is a further refusal
to follow the Guernsey decision.
Stewart v. United States2 involved a prisoner released on pro-
bation by the United States District Court and arrested while on
probation by a state sheriff on a criminal charge of violating a
state penal statute. The Court held here that the state court not
only had jurisdiction but could proceed with its action regardless
of the consent of the federal court. The court said that the state
could proceed even where the federal court affirmatively protested
the state action. This would support the decision in the Schmittroth
case. This is based on the theory that where the court of one
sovereign has possession of the accused and has the power to pro-
ceed in a criminal prosecution neither the court nor officers of
another sovereign may remove the accused since neither courtesy
nor comity can be enforced.
The preceding case follows the theory that a court may have
jurisdiction over a probationeer without the consent of the court
which placed him on probation. It also follows the trend in recog-
nizing that probation and physical custody are not to be equated.
Since the rule of comity, however, seems to be disregarded by this
decision it apparently would have only limited support in its
application.
DETENTION UNDER FEDERAL AUTHORITY
State courts are generally held to be without atthority to interfere
with the custody of a person detained by federal authorities. This
exclusive right of the federal judiciary may be waived however and
9. See Spellman v. Murphy, 217 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1954); Stripling v. United
States, 172 F.2d 636 (10th Cir. 1949).
10. 233 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1956).
11. Petition for rehearing of Strand v. Schrnittroth, 251 F.2d 590 (9th Cir. 1957).
12. 267 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1959).
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the accused may not complain of the action thus taken.'" Under the
principles of comity existing between the federal and state courts,
jurisdiction of the person of a federal prisoner may be conferred on
the state for trial purposes, provided proper application has been
made.'4 The fact that the state has inflicted punishment by im-
prisonment with the federal court's permission and before the
federal has tried to enforce the accused's sentence on a probation
violation does not infringe on the accused's rights.'
. Where a prisoner is tried and convicted under the authority of
the federal government a state cannot compel the prisoner to appear
for trial while he is being thus held.," Nor may the state by virtue
of a writ of habeas corpus release a prisoner confined by the federal
court. In such instances the prisoner may be rearrested by order of
the federal authorities since the state court was without jurisdiction
to release him.'7
A prisoner, however, who is under bail from a federal indict-
ment, of who has escaped from the custody of the federal authori-
ties may be arrested by the state for a crime or be indicted in a
state court. 8 In situations such as this the federal court does not
lose its jurisdiction of the accused by prosecution in the state
courts so as to prevent it from executing its judgment against the
defendant. 19
When a federal court acquires jurisdiction of a criminal case, it
is entitled as against a state court subsequently acquiring jurisdic-
tion to have its sentence executed first.201 Where a federal prisoner
has refused to accept commutation of a federal sentence, when
transferred to a state prison he is subject to the state sovereignity.21
A state court however, which has obtained custody of an accused,
has the jurisdiction to try him. This right is, not affected by the
fact that he was a ward of the federal government on probation;2
13. See, e.g., Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624 (1884); Gaines v. State, 95 Tex. Crim.
368, 251 S.W. 245 (1922). Even though prosecution in federal court is still pending.
Drummond v. State, 160 Tenn. 97, 21 S.W.2d 1039 (1929).
14. People v. Nokes, 25 Cal. App. 259, 77 P.2d 243 (1938).
15. U.S. ex. rel. Demarois v. Farrel, 87 F.2d 957 (8th Cir. 1937). Federal Court,
however, is not stopped from enforcing such a sentence because it failed to take custody
of the accused on learning of his imprisonment by the state.
16. People v. Nokes, 25 Cal. App. 259, 77 P.2d 243 (1938).
17. In re Johnson, 46 Fed. 477 (1st Cir. 1891).
18. Hebert v. State, 272 U.S. 312 (1926). (Where the federal authorities do not
insist on the prior jurisdiction of the federal court.)
19. People v. Benham, 71 Misc. 345, 128 N.Y.S. 610 (1911), U.S. v. Vannata, 290
Fed. 212 (D. 1923).
20. U.S. ex rel. Moore v. Traeger, 44 F.2d 312 (9th Cir. 1930); Albori v. U.S. 67
F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1933).
21. Chapman v. Scott, 10 F.2d 690 (2nd Cir. 1926).
22. State v. Makee, 193 La. 39, 190 So. 325 (1939). However a criminal proceeding
before a justice during the accused's period of probation under a federal court sentence
without obtaining permission of the federal court is unauthorized.
on bail, 23 or in the custody of the federal government at the time
of his trial.21
DETENTION UNDER STATE AUTHORITY
Since the states as well as the federal government are charged
with the duty of protecting the accused in the enjoyment of his
constitutional rights, the rule of priority of the court first obtaining
custody or jurisdiction of the accused applies to those under the
custody of a state court and prevents interference therewith by the
federal authorities whenever those rights are involved.2 ' A state
may however waive its exclusive right to the custody of a prisoner
and lend him to the federal government for prosecution, "' without
the state completely surrendering its jurisdiction over the prisoner.2 7
An inmate of a state prison who is produced for trial in a federal
court and remains in the custody of the state during the trial would
then remain in a state prison. " Even though a federal prisoner is
indicted in a state court for an offense and must remain in the
custody of a federal agent, this does not deprive the state of its
jurisdiction. He then is present in the state court and can conduct
his defense as effectively as if he were in the custody of that
court2 9
Where the defendant is granted bail and is arrested during the
trial on a warrant issued by a federal court, the state court does
not lose its previously acquired jurisdiction. ° It should be empha-
sized however that only the state and not the accused can raise the
question of comity."t
A prisoner who has been commited to bail after an indictment is
subject to arrest by the federal authorities. " The fact that the ac-
cused was on bail does not affect the jurisdiction of the federal
court to try the accused after custody of his person has been ob-
tained s' The state court may also waive its exclusive and prior
jurisdiction over one accused of an offense against state law, even
23. U.S. v. Pendergast, 28 F. Supp. 601 (D. 1939); Hebert v. State, 272 U.S. 312
(1926); Grant v. Guernsey, 63 F.2d 163 (1933).
24. Cato v. Smith, .104 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1939); Spencer v. Hamilton, 12 F.2d 976
(8th Cir. 1926).
25. Zerbst v. McPike, 97 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1938); Downey v. Schmidt, 4 1. Supp.
1 (D. 1933); New York v. Enno, 155 U.S. 89 (1894).
26. Rohr v. Hudspeth, 105 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1939).
27. Zerhst v. McPike, 97 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1938).
28. U.S. ex rel. Strewl v. Warden, 21 F. Supp. 502 (D. 1937).
29. Cato v. Smith, 104 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1939).
30. Simmons v. State, 165 Miss. 732, 141 So. 288 (1932).
31. Florio v. Edwards, 80 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1935).
32. Metcalf v. State, 156 Pac. 305 (Okla. 1915).
33. Vane v. U.S., 254 Fed. 28 (9th Cir. 1918); Florio v. Edwards, 80 F.2d 509 (5th
Cir. 1935).
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though the accused is on bail. " This principle may be carried a
step further. Where the defendant is imprisoned by the state but
paroled within its jurisdiction, a violation of parole, subjects the
defendant to serve the remainder of his term. In such a situation
the parole violater is not exempt from a federal detainer warrant
if the state does not raise timely objection."5 Generally one out on
bail for state offense may be arrested for a federal crime without
breach of comity.:", Conversly, the federal courts will not release a
prisoner held for violation of a federal law prior to the expiration
cf his sentence for violation of state laws.17
CONCLUSION
Since the rule of comity between federal and state courts seems
to be widely accepted and followed in cases of concurrent jurisdic-
tion as a means of orderly procedure, any process that tends to
disregard this rule would probably find only limited acceptance.
On the other hand there seems little doubt the trend is away
from that strict jurisdiction by the first court gaining control of the
accused and toward that of implied consent of a court in relinquish-
ing its jurisdiction over a probationeer when another court has
the defendant before it. It would seem then that in the absence of
an expressed denial by the court first acquiring jurisdiction, another
court may have jurisdiction over the accused providing the proper
procedure has been followed and the silence of the first court is
considered to be an implied consent for the second court to act.
RICHARD RAMAGE
34. U.S. v. Taylor, 284 Fed. 489 (D. 1921).
35. U.S. v. Marrin, 227 Fed. 314 (D. 1915).
36. Florio v. Edwards, 80 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1935).
37. Raine v. State, 143 Tenn. 168, 226 S.W. 189 (1920). (The general practice is
to the contrary.)
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